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THE LAWFUL RIGHTS OF MANKIND: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CODE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. By Paul 
Sieghart. New York: Oxford University Press. 1985. Pp. xix, 252. 
Cloth, $15.95; paper, $10.95. 
Imagine a world where the international community placed no 
constraints on how rulers treated their subjects, allowing them to cast 
aside human values such as life and liberty. A ruler in such a world 
could lawfully exploit, mistreat, and even exterminate entire strata of 
the state's population. International law would confront concerned na-
tions with an unseemly choice: follow the law and allow millions to 
die, or break the law to intervene directly in the sovereign affairs of 
another state. 
That world is easily imagined, for, as Paul Sieghart1 explains in his 
new book, The Lawful Rights of Mankind, we only left such a place in 
1945. In the book's preface, Sieghart evokes the possibility of Chan-
cellor Adolf Hitler dismissing a commission of concerned foreign rep-
resentatives with the claim - quite correct according to principles of 
international law in effect at the time - that the commission's interest 
1. Paul Sieghart, an English barrister, is an international arbitrator and consultant, with 11 
special interest in human rights law. He also wrote THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OP HUMAN 
RIGHTS (1983), a much more comprehensive examination of the international code of humnn 
rights. Sieghart suggests using this book as a companion to the larger work. P. viii. 
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in his subjects constituted an "ille,gitimate interference in the internal 
affairs of the sovereign German State" (p. vii). Sieghart maintains that 
an international code of human rights would at the very least strip the 
legal clothing from a Hitler or a Stalin and lay bare his monstrous 
crimes. Although Sieghart elegantly achieves his limited goal of pro-
viding the lay reader with a highly accessible overview of the interna-
tional human rights code - what lies behind it, how it was made, how 
it works, and what it says - he enjoys less success in dispelling the 
lawyer's doubts that the code provides the "hard law" necessary to 
dent the global abuse of human rights. 
As the book is geared to the legal novice, Sieghart begins with an 
entertaining allegory on the birth of rules of law (Chapter One). He 
creates a mythical village at the beginning of history - "Adamsville" 
- and leads the reader through its first encounters with the need to 
establish a legal system. Sieghart thereby outlines the key concepts of 
"laws" as binding rules on all community members, and "rights" as 
claims entitled to succeed under those laws (p. 13). · 
Most interesting to the international lawyer is Sieghart's allegorical 
treatment of enforcement and newcomers. Because the villagers are 
afraid to put enforcement powers in the hands of any individual, they 
choose to allow aggrieved parties to resort to reasonable self-help. 
Should that fail, the community as a whole will treat the offender as an 
"outlaw" and deny him or her the protections and benefits of being a 
part of the community. In the same vein, newcomers must accept the 
rules and obligations of the community before they may be considered 
as equals with those who formed the rules. Thus, Sieghart shows how 
individuals in Adamsville must accept and follow the community's 
rules to obtain the community's benefits. This allegory softens the lay 
reader's natural resistance to the notion that the community of nations 
can implement international rules without a legislature or a police 
force.2 
Sieghart leaves the allegorical for the real world, and sketches cen-
turies of legal history in three brief chapters. His central purpose in 
this ambitious historical discourse is to trace the development of the 
idea that a state's legitimacy springs from its people, and that individ-
uals hold inalienable rights which come not from the state, but inhere 
in their individual humanity. Beginning with the Renaissance and cul-
minating in the American and French Revolutions, these new notions 
of state legitimacy and individual rights laid the foundations for the 
post-World War II revolution in international human rights. Sieghart 
maintains that the horrors perpetrated by Stalin and Hitler shocked 
the world into establishing obligations external and superior to the 
2. Sieghart does not explore an important difference between Adamsville and the community 
of nations: unlike Sieghart's newcomers, new nations cannot pack up and leave if they disagree 
with the community's established laws. 
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state's previously uncontested sovereignty over human rights. The in-
ternational community achieved this the only way it knew how: 
through declarations, resolutions, and, most importantly, binding 
treaties. 
The code itself consists of three global treaties (the U.N. Charter, 
the U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ESCR), 
and the U.N. Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (CPR)), four re-
gional treaties (the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Social Charter, the 
American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Convention 
on Human and People's Rights), approximately twenty specialized 
treaties on more specific areas, and two nonbinding declarations (the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Declara-
tion of the Rights and Duties of Man). Sieghart uses the rest of the 
book to explain how these instruments operate, what obligations they 
create, and which rights they define and protect. He emphasizes that 
this code establishes a standard against which government behavior 
can be measured, much as scientists agree to international units of 
measurement (p. x). He thus divorces the code from any perceived 
philosophical or ideological underpinnings, as one need not meditate 
on the "true" meaning of "right" if each right is carefully defined in 
treaties ostensibly accepted by all parties as binding. 
Sieghart's exposition illustrates three points of particular impor-
tance. To begin with, some treaties vary the degree of obligation de-
pending on the attainability of the protection sought (pp. 73-75). 
Most treaties impose obligations which are "absolute and immediate" 
(p. 73); but the U.N. Convention on Economic and Social Rights and 
the European Social Charter establish "progressive" obligations that 
bind states to "take steps ... to the maximum of [their] available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively" the realization of 
rights set forth in the treaties. 3 These treaties establish rights such as 
the right to work, the right to adequate housing and health care, and 
the right to vocational programs. As Sieghart explains in subsequent 
chapters, negotiators imposed progressive obligations in recognition of 
the difficulty many countries face in raising the standards of living of 
their citizens. The other treaties go further than simply using lan-
guage that implies "immediate" obligations; they require countries to 
adopt domestic measures (such as legislation) to ensure compliance 
with the provisions (p. 74). Sieghart makes the important point that 
such obligations are objectively verifiable, in that states may ascertain 
treaty compliance by comparing one another's laws with the rights 
established in the relevant treaty. However, he fails to indicate that 
3. This language is taken from Article 2(1), U.N. Convention on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights, quoted at p. 74. 
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the same reasoning reveals the difficulties involved in verifying compli-
ance with treaties imposing progressive obligations. 
Secondly, Sieghart shows that the code establishes remedies on the 
national and international levels (Chapters Nine and Ten). The CPR 
and three regional treaties require parties to pass domestic legislation 
providing individuals with effective remedies against the state. States 
thus surrender a surprising degree of sovereignty. Unfortunately, to 
be effective such provisions require institutions (namely independent , 
judiciaries) that can only take root in certain confluences of circum-
stance and history, and that cannot be mandated into fruition by trea-
ties or proclamations. 
The treaties also establish international remedies for human rights 
violations. International law typically recognizes only the rights of 
states, forcing individuals to go through the state to seek redress, and 
then only for those claims which the state, as the aggrieved party, can 
advance. By specifically establishing international remedies for indi-
viduals, the code makes a radical departure from international prac-
tice, seeking to free the individual from relying on the state. 
Unfortunately, Sieghart explains, these international remedies (e.g., 
petitioning U.N. bodies for relief, bringing cases before regional coun-
cils) have been notoriously ineffectual, which, in the case of the U.N., 
is very much in keeping with the international clout it wields.4 
Sieghart's discussion leaves the reader with the uneasy impression that 
the individual's only effective remedy is to hope that nongovernmental 
organizations, such as Amnesty International, can mobilize interna-
tional political pressure against the regime. The treaties' bold reme-
dies may therefore have done little more than raise expectations and 
excite legal theorists. 
Thirdly, Sieghart maintains that human rights can be neither clas-
sified nor prioritized. He believes attempts to classify rights as "civil 
and political" and "economic and social" merely reflect cold war atti-
tudes (Western countries favor the former, Socialist countries promote 
the latter) (pp. 81-84). The CPR shares rights and objectives with the 
ESCR, although the latter may impose different obligations. In fact, 
each recognizes that the rights established in the other are on a par 
with its own (p. 83). According to Sieghart, "While it may be intellec-
tually stimulating to attempt such distinctions, one must be constantly 
aware of the danger of seeking to rank human rights in some kind of 
order of importance, reflecting one's own political or ideological 
prejudices" (pp. 82-83; emphasis in original). 
Sieghart devotes the final fifty pages of his book to an overview of 
the substance of the code. Because the entire international code lists 
4. Not only do such organizations lack the enforcement capability necessary to alter states' 
behavior, they also lack the political will to make the initial findings that human rights are indeed 
being violated on the scale necessary to justify condemnation or other action. Pp. 95-96. 
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forty to fifty distinct rights and freedoms (p. 79), Sieghart limits his 
examination to those rights he considers most representative of the 
code as a whole. This section of the book familiarizes the reader with 
the code's ambitious scope and far-flung objectives. 
Sieghart, through his readable prose and thoughtful explanations, 
succeeds admirably in introducing the lay reader to the international 
human rights code. However, he is perhaps too eager to convey his 
optimism about the code, particularly in Chapter Five where, in dis-
cussing the code's standards, he nearly drowns the reader with his 
enthusiasm: 
Nor are they na'ive, starry-eyed, or idealistic, either about states or about 
their subjects. On the contrary, they are sober and pragmatic. Starting 
from the realistic assumption that there will always be tensions and con-
flicts between rulers and ruled, the code displays a practical respect for 
both, and sets out to strike a workable balance between them .... The 
code therefore now constitutes the highest rank of safeguards against 
tyranny . . . . [pp. 40-41] 
This tone may strike the reader as somewhat misplaced, given the con-
tinuing horrors committed in open defiance of the code's safeguards. 
What the reader must remember is that Sieghart is discussing the 
code's content, and not its practical applications. Unfortunately, it is 
the latter that determines the code's effectiveness in shaping and im-
proving government behavior. To the skeptical reader, his stubbornly 
positive tone smacks of self-delusion and therefore mars his credibility. 
More important than the enthusiastic tenor of his descriptions is 
the substantive content of his reaction to criticisms that the code 
"amounts to no more than a lot of useless paper" (p. ix). He admits in 
the preface that "there are probably still no more than a couple of 
dozen or so countries where one can confidently say that [human 
rights] are reasonably well respected" (p. ix), yet in Chapter Ten he 
refers to cases involving those same countries to support his position 
that effective international remedies exist for aggrieved parties (p. 97). 
Thus, the only countries respecting the code's provisions and adhering 
to the remedy requirements are those that already have a consistently 
high record of respect for human rights. This says littJe for the code's 
global impact. 
Sieghart maintains that outlawing offending states provides an ef-
fective sanction against human rights violations, and asserts that the 
loss of legitimacy that results from deplorable human rights records 
contributed to the downfall of various regimes (p. 95). However, a 
multitude of factors played greater roles in the collapses of the regimes 
he cites, 5 and he fails to mention the many regimes existing today that 
consistently violate human rights, and yet are in no immediate danger 
5. Sieghart cites, inter alia, the Shah of Iran and President Somoza of Nicaragua. P. 95. 
Although international isolation may have played a role in their respective downfalls, that isola-
tion was as much politically motivated as it was motivated by a desire to "outlaw" serious human 
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of abdicating power (e.g., Vietnam, the USSR, Chile, South Africa). 
The level and impact of international condemnation may depend more 
on the role public opinion plays in the offending nation and its sup-
porters than it depends on the nature and magnitude of the violations 
themselves. In fact, international condemnation in general has not ap-
proached what could be characterized as a concerted community ef-
fort to "outlaw" offending regimes. As Sieghart recognizes in Chapter 
Ten, states depend too much on one another to countenance rupturing 
diplomatic relations in order to safeguard the human rights of foreign-
ers (p. 94). Thus, states often use human rights for ulterior ends, 
condemning violators only when politically expedient. These interna-
tional realities cast a grim pallor over Sieghart's optimistic gloss. 
Finally, Sieghart contends that offending countries' efforts to fit 
their offensive conduct into legal exceptions, such as "national emer-
gency" or "state of war," indicate the extent to which countries accept 
the code as imposing binding legal obligations (p. ix). However, he 
stops short of drawing the opposite implication, that such continued 
and blatantly disingenuous attempts to justify widespread treaty viola-
tions demonstrate that most countries treat human rights obligations 
as "soft law": standards that provide common objectives but bind no 
one. Widespread violations may establish a dangerous international 
practice of noncompliance with human rights treaties, undermining 
the validity of the code as well as that of related treaties. Sieghart's 
survey of the multitude of human rights guaranteed by the code sets 
states' behavior in even starker contrast with the code's standards, and 
may further reinforce the skeptical reader's initial perceptions that the 
code strives to be law but remains only an admirable set of aspirations. 
To Sieghart's great credit, he recognizes the force of objections to 
the code such as those advanced above. He realizes that gross viola-
tions of human rights still occur, and that the code has not yet reached 
anything like a consistent record of application. He emphasizes that 
the code is still very new in the span oflegal history, and that the very 
existence of human rights standards is in itself cause for celebration. 
Even though horrors may continue apparently unabated, at least to-
day we can legitimately refer to them as violations of law and not 
merely as immoral acts. By establishing new norms of international 
behavior, the code has provided the world community with the inter-
nationally recognized standard of measurement it needs to strip future 
Hitlers and Stalins of their legal trappings. Although Sieghart's opti-
mistically legalistic approach may threaten some of his credibility, 
most readers will close his book convinced that he may not be far 
wrong when he says: "For, in various ways, [the code] does work: if it 
rights violators. The violations perhaps mobilized internal opposition to the regimes more than 
they marshalled effective international condemnation of those regimes. 
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did not exist, there would today be far more violations of human rights 
than there already are" (p. 44; emphasis in original). 
- Alexander W. Joel 
